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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
DAVID F. OAKES, M.D., 
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant, 
V. 
BOISE HEART CLINIC PHYSICIANS, 
PLLC, 
Defendant-Counterclaimant-
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION 
) REGARDING ADDITION TO THE 
) CLERK'S.RECORD 
) 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 38146-2010 
) Ada County Docket No. 2009-15341 
) 
) 
) 
A STIPULATION REGARDING ADDITION TO THE CLERK'S RECORD was filed 
counsel for Respondent on February 9, 2011. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the STIPULATION REGARDING ADDITION TOT 
CLERK'S RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and upon receipt of the Clerk's Record 
Appeal, the file stamped copies of the document which accompanied this Stipulation shall 
inserted into the Record on Appeal: 
l. Bench Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict, file-stam 
September 21, 2010 . 
. A.it 
DATED this _b__ day of February 2011. 
For the Supreme Court 
cc: Counsel of Record 
UGMENTATIONRECORD 
ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION REGARDING ADDITION TO THE CLERK'S RECOR 
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In the Supren1e Court of the State of Idaho 
DAVID F. OAKES, M.D., 
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-A ppellant, 
V. 
BOISE HEART CLThTIC PHYSICIANS, 
PLLC, 
Defendant-Counterclaimant-
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION 
) REGARDING ADDITION TO THE 
) CLERK'S RECORD 
) 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 38146-2010 
) Ada County Docket No. 2009-15341 
) 
) 
) 
A STIPULATION REGARDING ADDITION TO THE CLERK'S RECORD was filed by 
counsel for Respondent on February 9, 2011. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the STIPULATION REGARDil\JG ADDITION TO THE 
CLERK'S RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and upon receipt of the Clerk's Record on 
Appeal, the file stamped copies of the document which accompanied this Stipulation shall be 
inserted into the Record on Appeal: 
1. Bench Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict, file-stamped 
September 21, 2010. 
DATED this i4~ day of February 2011. 
For the Supreme Court 
cc: Counsel of Record 
ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION REGARDING ADDITION TO THE CLERK'S RECORD 
-Docket No. 38146-2010 
Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com 
Kara L. Heikkila 
ISB #8090; klh@hallfarley.com 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
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By p,:c_- N'.:::...SOf, 
OE:F-JTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DAVID F. OAKES, M.D., 
P laintiff/Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
BOISE HEART CLINIC PHYSICIANS, PLLC, 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. 
Case No. CV OC 0915341 
BENCH BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT 
COMES NOW defendant Boise Heart Clinic, PLLC ("Boise Heart Clinic"), by and 
through its undersigned counsel of record, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., and hereby 
submits this bench brief in Support of Defendant's in-court Motion for a directed verdict 
pursuant to IRCP 50(a). 
BENCH BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT - I 
I. SUMMARY 
Plaintiff Dr. David Oakes has failed to support by substantial evidence his claims for 
breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Idaho Wage Claim 
Act, quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, and conversion. Boise Heart Clinic respectfully 
moves for a directed verdict on these claims. 
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. Standard on a Motion for Directed Verdict 
A motion for directed verdict may be granted so long as there is not substantial evidence 
to justify submitting the case to the jury. Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 
(1984). Rule 50(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides a party may move for a 
directed verdict "at the close of evidence offered by an opponent," and requires that the moving 
party state the specific grounds for the motion. See I.R.C.P. 50(a); see also Idaho Trial 
Handbook, § 28:2 (2d ed.). 
When deciding a motion for directed verdict, the trial court applies a substantial evidence 
test. Thus, the trial court "must determine whether, admitting the truth of the adverse evidence 
and drawing every legitimate inference most favorably to the opposing party, there exists 
substantial evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury." Powers v. Honda Motor 
Company, 139 Idaho 333, 335, 79 P.3d 154, 156 (2003) (citations omitted); Idaho Trial 
Handbook § 28:2 ("For purposes of that determination, the moving party admits the truth of the 
opponent's evidence and every favorable inference which may legitimately be drawn therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the opponent") (citing Stephens v. Sterns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 
41(1984)). 
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"The "substantial evidence" test does not require the ( opposing party's] evidence to be 
[direct or] uncontradicted. It requires only that the evidence be of sufficient quantity and 
probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that a verdict in favor of the party against 
whom the motion is made is proper." Powers, supra (citations omitted). Instead, "substantial 
evidence is 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.'" Elce v. State of Idaho and Western Const., Inc., 110 Idaho 361,363, 716 P.2d 505, 
507 (1986). However, a verdict cannot be based upon speculation or conjecture, and, therefore, a 
party opposing a motion for a directed verdict cannot rely on speculation or conjecture to supply 
an essential element of proof to support submission of its claim to the jury. Id. 
B. Grounds for Dr. Oakes's Failure to Establish Substantial Evidence in 
Support of His Claims 
Dr. Oakes claims that Boise Heart Clinic breached a contract under which he is owed 
Gainshare proceeds by failing to pay him those proceeds. However, Dr. O~es is not entitled to 
the Gainshare proceeds he is claiming pursuant to either his employment contract or the 
Gainshare agreement, and thus Boise Heart Clinic cannot be said to have committed a breach for 
not paying him those proceeds. Furthermore, with no contract entitling him to the Gainshare 
proceeds he is seeking, failure to pay such proceeds cannot amount to a failure to pay a wage 
under Idaho law. Correspondingly, the existence of a valid contract prevents a claim for the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and for unjust enrichment. His claim of 
conversion must similarly fail based on the contract language regarding the adjustments to 
accounts receivable and the lack of entitlement to the assets of the Boise Heart Clinic under the 
contract. 
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I. Failure of the Breach of Contract Claim 
Dr. Oakes has failed to establish a breach of contract claim because neither of the 
contracts at issue entitles him to the Gainshare proceeds. A plaintiff bears the burden of 
establishing the existence of a contract and the fact of its breach. 0 'Dell v. Basabe, et al., 119 
Idaho 796,810 P.2d 1082 (1991). When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its 
interpretation and legal effect are questions of law. Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 
141 Idaho 185, 108 P.3d 332, 337 (2005). In Bakker, the plaintiff made contractual and 
statutory claims for wages, and for quantum meruit based on language set out in her employment 
agreement regarding how and when compensation would be paid: 
Your compensation will be $3500 per month paid semi-monthly at 
$1750 per period. You will also be paid .25% of 1% override on 
all successful closings of escrow on units at Thunder Spring. This 
begins as of your first day of employment estimated to be on or 
about December 30, 2001. This includes all transactions written 
inside or outside the sales venue, and will be in effect until all units 
at Thunder Spring close escrow. This will not be applicable for 
units previously disclosed by the developer or those in a holdover 
period with McCann Daech Fenton. Further, this is in affect (sic) 
only during your term of employment with ... Thunder Spring. : 
Id. at 337-338. The Court held that this language, and thus the contract, was unambiguous in 
referring to the entire compensation package, both the monthly wage and the earning of 
commissions. Id. at 338. 
Based on testimony, Dr. Oakes was an employee, not owner, subject to an employment 
contract with the Boise Heart Clinic, which was negotiable, reviewed, and executed on an annual 
basis. He testified he would have participated in Gainshare "regardless of whether [he] made a 
dime." Moreover, he admitted in his Complaint and in his deposition that Gainshare was not 
covered in his employment contract with the Boise Heart Clinic. See Complaint at ,I 9; Exh. 193, 
63:2-5. Dr. Oakes admitted in his deposition there was no written contract between himself and 
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the Boise Heart Clinic regarding Gainshare proceeds. Id., 62: 19-63: I 0. To the extent that Dr. 
Oakes might argue that a motion for a directed verdict is inappropriate because his testimony at 
trial with respect to the two contracts differed from his deposition testimony, such argument is 
unpersuasive. A party cannot survive a motion for a directed verdict by attempting to 
manufacture substantial evidence of his claim. As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
puts it, 
"a party cannot create an issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting 
his prior deposition testimony." Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 
952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir.1991) ... Cf Combs v. Rockwell lnt'l 
Corp., 927 F.2d 486, 488-89 (9th Cir.1991) (dismissing with 
prejudice and granting Rule 11 sanctions against a party and its 
counsel because the attorney, in an effort to avoid summary 
judgment, made substantive changes to the party's deposition 
testimony in violation of FRCP 30(e)) ... ; Thorn v. Sundstrand 
Aerospace Corp., 207 F.3d 383, 389 (7th Cir.2000) ("We also 
believe, by analogy to the cases which hold that a subsequent 
affidavit may not be used to contradict the witness's deposition, 
that a change of substance which actually contr~dicts the transcript 
is impermissible unless it can plausibly be represented as the 
correction of an error in transcription, such as dropping a 'not."') 
( citations omitted). 
Hambleton Bros. Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enterprises, Inc., 397 F .3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir._2005). 
The Gainshare Agreement defines "Group" as the Boise Heart Clinic, and sets out that St. 
Luke's will pay the Group an amount of money based on the cost savings generated. 
Defendant's Exhibits 105 and 106. Moreover, critical language of the Gainshare Agreement 
spells out the discretionary nature of how the Group may handle the income it receives, and how 
St. Luke's would have no liability associated with how the Group treated that income: 
4. (d) Physicians will participate in the Program only through 
participation in the Group. Participation [sic] Physicians shall be 
compensated by each Group's sole discretion and St. Luke's shall 
have no liability to individual Participating Physicians relating to 
payment hereunder. 
Id The Gainshare Agreement unambiguously provides for payment to the Group (Boise Heart 
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Clinic) and allows the Group discretion on what to do with the payment. Dr. Oakes cannot 
overcome that clear language or the similarly clear language limiting St. Luke's liability in this 
scenario. 1 
Dr. Oakes remams bound by his employment contract with the Boise Heart Clinic. 
Paragraph 5, Accounting Required, clarified that "all income generated by the Physician for his 
services as a Physician, shall belong to the Company." Defendant's Exhibit 101. Under 
paragraph 14, Relationship Between the Parties, language was set out that "nothing in the 
contract shall be construed to give the Physician any interest in the tangible or intangible assets 
of the Company." Id. An integration clause, paragraph 19, clarified, consistent with Dr. Oakes's 
testimony, that the employment agreement represented the entire agreement between th~ parties 
with respect to the subject, which included the compensation set out in paragraph 3. Id. This 
employment agreement is the only contract that could bind Boise Heart Clinic with respect to 
payment of compensation to Dr. Oakes and Dr. Oakes agreed it does not cover Gainshare 
payments to him. 
Dr. Oakes does allege that Boise Heart Clinic made representations to him, extrinsic to 
both contracts, that he would get the portion of the Gainshare money that he is now seeking. To 
the extent that such alleged promises were made before the contracts came into effect, they were 
merged into the contracts. Both the employment and Gainshare agreements contain merger 
clauses. Defendant's Exhibits 101, at ~ 19; 105 and 106 at ~ 22. Similarly, to the extent any 
such alleged promises were made after the contracts took effect, they would have constituted 
modifications to the agreements, which, according to the merger clauses, would have needed to 
have been in writing and signed by the parties, and would also have had to have been supported 
by new consideration. Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731,639 P.2d 429 (1981) (holding that 
1 St Luke's is obviously not a party to this suit. 
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consideration is required for modification, citing Dashnea v. Panhandle Lumber Co. Ltd., 57 
Idaho 232, 64 P.2d 390 (1937); Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 275 Or. 567, 551 P.2d 
1288 (1976)). Dr. Oakes has presented no evidence that he offered any additional consideration 
in exchange for any modifications to the existing contracts. Dr. Oakes testified that he signed no 
contract modifying his employment agreement and made no request to modify it. 
Finally, to the extent that Dr. Oak es may allege that an implied contract regarding 
Gainshare entitled him to monies he is seeking, that claim must also fail, due to the fact that there 
is an express agreement covering Gainshare. 
Because Dr. Oakes has failed to establish by substantial evidence a breach of contract 
claim, a directed verdict must be entered on this claim and the claim must not be sent to the jury. 
2. Failure of the Idaho Wage Claim Act Claim 
Because the employment contract did not cover Gainshare, Dr. Oakes cannot establish an 
Idaho Wage Claim Act violation, as such a claim is inherently tied to the contract for 
compensation. Dr. Oakes testified he was not contending that he was not paid for services under 
his employment contract regarding Gainshare, as he was fully paid for those services. Again, 
Gainshare is based on cost savings associated with products, not with services. Dr. Oakes also 
testified that he was not claiming that the Boise Heart Clinic failed to pay him wages under his 
employment contract. 
The Supreme Court has held that when a plaintiff in a case fails to establish that amounts 
in dispute were actually due from his employer because no contract provision covering that 
matter was ever finalized, the plaintiffs statutory wage claim was appropriately dismissed. Gray 
v. Tri-Way Const. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 210 P.3d 63, 70 (2009). Similarly, in Bakker v. 
Thunder Spring-Wareham, where the plaintiffs employment contract was clear and 
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unambiguous and her commissions complied with general rules governmg the earnings of 
commissions by a broker, the Supreme Court concluded that any other terms associated with her 
wages would be found in and determined by the terms of the employment agreement negotiated 
between the parties. Bakker, supra, 108 P.3d at 336-37. Dr. Oakes agrees Gainshare monies 
were not mentioned, nor were they covered, by the employment agreement. As such, Dr. Oakes' 
wage claim must fail. 
Moreover, the nature of Gainshare savings is antithetical to a wage claim. The principle 
behind wage laws has to do with the fact that the "average wage earner depends greatly on the 
regular receipt of earned wages. If unpaid, serious economic injury may result to the wage 
earner." Goff v. HJ.H Co., 95 Idaho 83 7 (1974). This principle was supp9rted, for example, by 
the holding in Bi/ow v. Preco, Inc., 132 Idaho 23, 966 P.2d 23 (1998). In that case, the employee 
bought a wage claim for unpaid deferred incentive compensation due to him under his contract. 
Id. at 25, 966 P.2d at 25. The employment agreement precisely defined the parameters of the 
deferred compensation, which consisted of 
6.25% of Preco's monthly "pre-tax profit" as defined in the 
agreement. Preco paid out 20% of the 6.25% each month ( or 
1.25% of Preco's monthly "pre-tax profit") as a "current incentive 
compensation payment" for that month. The remaining 80% ( or 
5% of Preco's "pre-tax profit") was allocated to a deferral account. 
The amount allocated to the deferral account was to be paid to 
Bilow over a rolling four-year period, with 1148th of the account 
balance being paid each month, beginning in January of 
1990. FN2The purpose of the incentive compensation plan was to 
average Bilow's income over a four-year period. 
FN2. The agreement explained a monthly payout in the following 
fashion: 
For example, in the event that Bilow has been an employee of 
Preco pursuant to this Agreement through the month of January of 
1990, Bilow shall be paid as incentive compensation for the month 
of January 1990 any positive totaJ of the following positive and/or 
negative amounts: (a) 1.25% of the January 1990 Preco "pre-tax 
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profit," (b) 1148th of 5% of the 1989 Preco "pre-tax profit" from 
the Bilow "deferral account," (c) 1148th of 5% of the 1988 Preco 
"pre-tax profit" from the Bilow "deferral account," (d) 1148th of 
5% of the 1987 Preco "pre-tax profit" from the Bilow "deferral 
account," and (e) 1148th of 5% of the I 986 Preco "pre-tax profit" 
from the Bilow "deferral account." 
Id at 26, 966 P.2d at 26. The Court held that the deferred compensation monies constituted 
"wages" under Idaho wage law, and quoted the district court's analysis: 
Bilow earned, as payment for services rendered over the 
course of seven years, the balance of the funds in the deferral 
account. They were part and parcel of his incentive compensation 
agreement, and were paid out over a rolling four year period. 
These funds represent compensation paid in direct consideration of 
services rendered, over and above Bilow's "regular paychecks" 
Id at 29, 966 P.2d at 29. The deferred compensation in this case was directly related to Bilow's 
services and was properly understood as compensation falling within the definition of a "wage." 
By contrast, the only parameter of Gainshare savings that might have been paid to Dr. 
. 
Oakes that is defined anywhere in writing states that the payment of Gainshare proceeds is 
discretionary. Defendant's Exhibits 105 and 106 at ,r 4.d. Gainshare savings were not tied 
directly to Dr. Oakes' performance; indeed, it was the group, rather than the individual, that 
participated in Gainshare. For example, Exhibit "C" of the Gainshare agreements (Defendant's 
Exhibits I 05 and I 06) provides that "[ n]otwithstanding the following, no payment shall be made 
in the event that Group's utiliz.ation of the Cost Savings Items is less than the recommended 
minimum utiliz.ation of such items .... " In other words, if Boise Heart Clinic as a Group failed 
to use enough of the cost saving items, the group would not get any Gainshare payout 
whatsoever, regardless of whether Dr. Oakes did everything he could to help the Group meet the 
minimum requirements. 
Also in contrast to the compensation in Bi/ow, there was further uncertainty regarding 
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any payout to physicians under the Gainshare program due to a termination clause. On page 13, 
~ 15, the Gainshare agreement states that "any party may terminate this Agreement with or 
without cause at any time by giving the other party written notice of such intention at least thirty 
(30) days prior to such termination. Upon expiration of the [one year] term or sooner 
termination of this Agreement (the "Termination Date"), all obligations of the parties to each 
other hereunder shall cease .... " Defendant's Exhibits I 05 and 106. Had St. Luke's or Boise 
Heart Clinic or Goodroe terminated the Gainshare agreement before payment (if any) from St. 
Luke's to Boise Heart Clinic was made, St. Luke's obligation, if any, to pay Boise Heart Clinic 
would have ceased. Stated another way, there was no contractual guarantee that Boise Heart 
Clinic would receive money that it could then, at its sole di~cretion, attribute to Dr. Oakes for 
this outside program. 
3. Failure of the Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing protects the rights of parties to receive 
benefits of an employment agreement that they have entered. Parker v. Boise Telco Fed. Credit 
Union, 129 Idaho 248, 923 P.2d 493 (1996). That is, only denial of a benefit to which the 
employee was entitled under the terms of the employment agreement will support a claim for 
breach of this covenant. Id. The covenant does not inject substantive terms into a contract, but 
requires only that the parties perform in good faith the obligations imposed by their agreement. 
Id. 
No covenant will be implied which is contrary to the terms of the 
contract negotiated and executed by the parties. The covenant 
requires "that the parties perform in good faith the obligations 
imposed by their agreement," and a violation of the covenant 
occurs only when "either party . . . violates, nullifies or 
significantly impairs any benefit of the ... contract .... " 
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Idaho First Natl. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 288, 824 P.2d 841, 863 (1991) 
(citations omitted). 
Because Dr. Oakes has admitted in this lawsuit that his employment contract did not 
cover Gainshare proceeds, he cannot recover under the breach of contract or a breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing theory as it relates to that contract. As such, Dr. Oakes 
has also failed to establish substantial evidence of a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
4. Failure of the Claim for Unjust Enrichment 
Unjust enrichment, or restitution, is the measure of recovery under a contract implied at 
law. Barry v. Pacific West Coast, Inc., 140 Idaho 827; 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004). These claims 
are not established when there is an express contract governing the relationships of the parties. 
Wolfordv. Tankersley, 107 Idaho 1062, 695 P.2d 1201 (1984) (emphasis added). However, an 
equitable remedy may be found even when an express contract exists if the contract is unlawful, 
unconscionable, or violates public policy. US. Bank Nat. Ass 'n v. Kuenzli, I 34 Idaho 222, 999 
P.2d 877 (2000). Whether a contract violates public policy is a question of law for the court to 
determine from all the facts and circumstances of each case. Quiring v. Quiring, l 30 Idaho 560, 
944 P.2d 695, 70 I (1997). Public policy may be found in statutes, judicial decisions, or the 
constitution. Id. Notably, as a matter of public policy, nothing in the Idaho Wage Claim Act 
places limits on the ability of the employer and employee to contract for the terms of the 
employee's compensation. Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 108 P.3d 
332, 337 (2005). As long as the employer is meeting the minimum wage requirements of state 
law, further compensation is subject to negotiation between the employer and employee. Id. 
Correspondingly, for a contract to be voided as unconscionable, it must be both procedurally and 
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substantively unconscionable. Id. at 338., citing Lavey v. Regence BlueShield of Idaho, 139 
Idaho 37, 72 P.3d 877 (2003)(citing cases). "Procedural unconscionability relates to the 
bargaining process leading to the agreement while substantive unconscionability focuses on the 
terms of the agreement itself." Id. It is not sufficient that the contractual provisions appear 
unwise or their enforcement seems harsh. Id. Whether a contractual term is unconscionable is 
also a matter of law. Id. 
Here, a claim for unjust enrichment has not been supported by any evidence, let alone 
substantial evidence, because an employment contract governs the relationship of the parties. 
Additionally, such a claim cannot be made in the absence of claims in this case that the contracts 
at issue were unlawful, unconscionable, or vinlated public policy. No evidence has been 
admitted on such an allegation. 
As such, a motion for directed verdict is appropriate on this claim. 
5. Failure of the Claim for Conversion 
A claim for conversion requires: 1) that the defendant exercised dominion and control 
over plaintiff's items of property without a right to do so, 2) that the plaintiff was consequently 
deprived of possession of those items of property, and 3) that the plaintiff was damaged. Peasley 
Transfer & Storage Co., 132 Idaho 732, 979 P.2d 605 (1999). Under the express terms of Dr. 
Oakes's employment contract, paragraph 14, he had no right as an employee to any assets of the 
Boise Heart Clinic. Dr. Oakes testified that the contract specifically stated he had no interest in 
the tangible or intangible assets of the Boise Heart Clinic. The amount earned under the contract 
with St. Luke's was income to and an asset of the Boise Heart Clinic to which he had no 
entitlement (and such amount was "comingled" in Boise Heart's account with other Boise Heart 
income). Nor did anything in the Gainshare Agreement establish his right to any of the 
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payments made under the terms of that contract with the Boise Heart Clinic. That is, Dr. Oakes 
cannot and did not establish a property right or a deprivation in this circumstance. 
Based on this failure, this claim too must be subject to a directed verdict. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing specific failures to establish substantial evidence on these claims, 
the Boise Heart Clinic respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion for Directed Verdict. 
DATED this 2.1_ day of September, 2010. 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, P.A. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _2j_ day of September, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following: 
Thomas A. Banducci 
Dara Labrum 
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN 
PLLC 
802 West Bannock, Ste. 500 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Fax No. 342-4455 
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